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Abstract
The protection of privacy of individual-level information in genome-wide as-
sociation study (GWAS) databases has been a major concern of researchers
following the publication of “an attack” on GWAS data by Homer et al. [1].
Traditional statistical methods for confidentiality and privacy protection of
statistical databases do not scale well to deal with GWAS data, especially
in terms of guarantees regarding protection from linkage to external infor-
mation. The more recent concept of differential privacy, introduced by the
cryptographic community, is an approach that provides a rigorous definition
of privacy with meaningful privacy guarantees in the presence of arbitrary
external information, although the guarantees may come at a serious price
in terms of data utility. Building on such notions, Uhler et al. [2] proposed
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new methods to release aggregate GWAS data without compromising an in-
dividual’s privacy. We extend the methods developed in [2] for releasing
differentially-private χ2-statistics by allowing for arbitrary number of cases
and controls, and for releasing differentially-private allelic test statistics. We
also provide a new interpretation by assuming the controls’ data are known,
which is a realistic assumption because some GWAS use publicly available
data as controls. We assess the performance of the proposed methods through
a risk-utility analysis on a real data set consisting of DNA samples collected
by the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium and compare the methods
with the differentially-private release mechanism proposed by Johnson and
Shmatikov [3].
Keywords: differential privacy, genome-wide association study (GWAS),
Pearson χ2-test, allelic test, contingency table, single-nucleotide
polymorphism (SNP)
1. Introduction
A genome-wide association study (GWAS) tries to identify genetic vari-
ations that are associated with a disease. A typical GWAS examines single-
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) from thousands of individuals and pro-
duces aggregate statistics, such as the χ2-statistic and the corresponding
p-value, to evaluate the association of a SNP with a disease.
For many years researchers have assumed that it is safe to publish aggre-
gate statistics of SNPs that they found most relevant to the disease. Because
these aggregate statistics were pooled from thousands of individuals, they
believed that their release would not compromise the participants’ privacy.
However, such belief was challenged when Homer et al. [1] demonstrated that,
under certain conditions, given an individual’s genotype, one only needs the
minor allele frequencies (MAFs) in a study and other publicly available MAF
information, such as SNP data from the HapMap1 project, in order to “accu-
rately and robustly” determine whether the individual is in the test popula-
tion or the reference population. Here, the test population can be the cases
in a study, and the reference population can be the data from the HapMap
project. Homer et al. [1] defined a distance metric that contrasts the simi-
larity between an individual and the test population and that between the
1http://hapmap.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
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individual and the reference population, and constructed a t-test based on
this distance metric. They then showed that their method of identifying an
individual’s membership status has almost zero false positive rate and zero
false negative rate.
However, Braun et al. [4] argued that the key assumptions of the Homer
et al. [1] attack are too stringent to be applicable in realistic settings. Most
problematic are the assumptions that (i) the SNPs are in linkage equilibrium
and (ii) that the individual, the reference population, and the test popula-
tion are samples from the same underlying population. They presented a
sensitivity analysis of the key assumptions and showed that violation of the
first assumption results in a substantial increase in variance and violation of
the second condition, together with the condition that the reference popula-
tion and the test population have different sizes, results in the test statistic
deviating considerably from the standard normal distribution.
Notwithstanding the apparent limitation of the Homer et al. [1] attack,
the National Institute of Health (NIH) was cautious about the potential
breach of privacy in genetic studies (see Couzin [5] and Zerhouni and Nabel
[6]), and swiftly instituted an elaborate approval process that every researcher
has to go through in order to gain access to aggregate genetic data.2,3 This
NIH policy remains in effect today.
The paper by Homer et al. [1] attracted considerable attention within
the genetics community and spurred interest in investigating the vulnerabil-
ity of confidentiality protection of GWAS databases. The research efforts
include modifications and extensions of the Homer et al. attack, alternative
formulations of the identification problem, and different aspects of attacking
and protecting the GWAS databases; e.g., see [7–17]. In partial response to
this literature, Uhler et al. [2] proposed new methods for releasing aggregate
GWAS data without compromising an individual’s privacy by focusing on
the release of differentially-private minor allele frequencies, χ2-statistics and
p-values.
In this paper, we develop a differentially-private allelic test statistic and
extend the results on differentially-private χ2-statistics in [2] to allow for an
arbitrary number of cases and controls. We start with some main defini-
tions and notation in Section 2. The new sensitivity results are presented in
2http://gwas.nih.gov/pdf/Data%20Sharing%20Policy%20Modifications.pdf
3http://epi.grants.cancer.gov/dac/da_request.html
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Section 3. Uhler et al. [2] proposed an algorithm based on the Laplace mech-
anism for releasing theM most relevant SNPs in a differentially-private way.
In the same paper they also developed an alternative approach to differential
privacy in the GWAS setting using what is known as the exponential mech-
anism linked to an objective function perturbation method by Chaudhuri
et al. [18]. This was proposed as a way to achieve a differentially-private
algorithm for detecting epistasis. But the exponential mechanism could in
principle have also been used as a direct alternative to the Laplace mech-
anism of Uhler et al. [2]. This is in fact what Johnson and Shmatikov [3]
proposed. Their method selects the top-ranked M SNPs using the exponen-
tial mechanism. In Section 4 we review the algorithm based on the Laplace
mechanism from [2] and propose a new algorithm based on the exponential
mechanism by adapting the method by Johnson and Shmatikov [3]. Finally,
in Section 5 we compare our two algorithms to the algorithm proposed in [3]
by analyzing a data set consisting of DNA samples collected by the Wellcome
Trust Consortium (WTCCC)4 and made available to us for reanalysis.
2. Main Definitions and Notation
The concept of differential privacy, recently introduced by the crypto-
graphic community (e.g., Dwork et al. [19]), provides a notion of privacy
guarantees that protect GWAS databases against arbitrary external infor-
mation.
Definition 1. Let D denote the set of all data sets. Write D ∼ D′ if D and
D′ differ in one individual. A randomized mechanism K is ǫ-differentially
private if, for all D ∼ D′ and for any measurable set S ⊂ R,
Pr(K(D) ∈ S)
Pr(K(D′) ∈ S)
≤ eǫ.
Definition 2. The sensitivity of a function f : DN → Rd, where DN denotes
the set of all databases with N individuals, is the smallest number S(f) such
that
||f(D)− f(D′)||1 ≤ S(f),
for all data sets D,D′ ∈ DN such that D ∼ D′.
4http://www.wtccc.org.uk/
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Table 1: Genotype distribution
# of minor alleles
0 1 2 Total
Case r0 r1 r2 R
Control s0 s1 s2 S
Total n0 n1 n2 N
Table 2: Allelic distribution
Allele type
Minor Major Total
Case r1 + 2r2 2r0 + r1 2R
Control s1 + 2s2 2s0 + s1 2S
Total n1+2n2 2n0+n1 2N
Releasing f(D) + b, where b ∼ Laplace
(
0, S(f)
ǫ
)
, satisfies the definition of
ǫ-differential privacy (e.g., see [19]). This type of release mechanism is often
referred to as the Laplace mechanism. Here ǫ is the privacy budget; a smaller
value of ǫ implies stronger privacy guarantees.
2.1. SNP Summaries Using Contingency Tables
Following the notation in [20], we can summarize the data for a single SNP
in a case-control study with R cases and S controls using a 2 × 3 genotype
contingency table shown in Table 1, or a 2×2 allelic contingency table shown
in Table 2. We require that margins of the contingency table be positive.
Definition 3. The (Pearson) χ2-statistic based on a genotype contingency
table (Table 1) is
Y =
(r0N − n0R)
2
n0RS
+
(r1N − n1R)
2
n1RS
+
(r2N − n2R)
2
n2RS
.
Definition 4. The allelic test is also known as the Cochran-Armitage trend
test for the additive model. The allelic test statistic based on a genotype
contingency table (Table 1) is equivalent to the χ2-statistic based on the
corresponding allelic contingency table (Table 2). The allelic test statistic
can be written as
YA =
2N3
RS
{(s1 + 2s2)−
S
N
(n1 + 2n2)}
2
2N(n1 + 2n2)− (n1 + 2n2)2
.
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The Pearson χ2-test for genotype data and the allelic test for allele data
are among the most commonly used statistical tests for association in GWAS.
Zheng et al. [21] suggest using the allelic test when the genetic model of the
phenotype is additive, and the Pearson χ2-test when the genetic model is
unknown.
3. Sensitivity Results
Under the assumption that there are an equal number of cases and con-
trols, Uhler et al. [2] found the sensitivities of the χ2-statistic, the corre-
sponding p-value and the projected p-value. For completeness, we briefly
review these results here.
Theorem 3.1 (Uhler et al. [2]). The sensitivity of the χ2-statistic based on a
3×2 contingency table with positive margins and N/2 cases and N/2 controls
is 4N
N+2
.
Theorem 3.2 (Uhler et al. [2]). The sensitivity of the p-values of the χ2-
statistic based on a 3 × 2 contingency table with positive margins and N/2
cases and N/2 controls is exp(−2/3), when the null distribution is a χ2-
distribution with 2 degrees of freedom.
Corollary 3.3 (Uhler et al. [2]). Projecting all p-values larger than p∗ =
exp(−N/c) onto p∗ results in a sensitivity of exp(−N/c)−exp
(
−N(2Nc−4N−4c+c
2)
2c(Nc−2N−c)
)
for any fixed constant c ≥ 3, which is a factor of N/2.
In the remainder of this section, we generalize these results to allow for an
arbitrary number of cases and controls. This makes the proposed methods
applicable in a typical GWAS setting, in which there are more controls than
cases, as researchers often use data pertaining to other diseases as controls
to increase the statistical power.
3.1. Sensitivity Results for the Pearson χ2-Statistic
We first consider the situation in which the adversary has complete infor-
mation about the controls. This situation arises when a GWAS uses publicly
available data for the controls, such as those from the HapMap project. In
this scenario, it is only necessary to protect information about the cases.
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Theorem 3.4. Let D denote the set of all 2 × 3 contingency tables with
positive margins, R cases and S controls. Suppose the numbers of controls of
all three genotypes are known. Let N = R + S, and smax = max{s0, s1, s2}.
The sensitivity of the χ2-statistic based on tables in D is bounded above by
N2
RS
smax
1+smax
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 3.4 gives an upper bound for the sensitivity of the χ2-statistic
based on 2×3 contingency tables with positive margins and known numbers
of controls for all three genotypes. In Corollary 3.5 we show that, assuming
r0 ≥ r2 and s0 ≥ s2, which reflects the definition of a major and minor allele,
the upper bound for the sensitivity is attained.
Corollary 3.5. Let D denote the set of all 2 × 3 contingency tables with
positive margins, R cases and S controls. We further assume that for tables
in D, r0 ≥ r2 and s0 ≥ s2; i.e., in the case and control populations the
number of individuals having two minor alleles is no greater than the number
of individuals having two major alleles. The sensitivity of the χ2-statistic
based on tables in D is N
2
RS
(
1− 1
max{S,R}+1
)
, where N = R + S.
Proof. For a change that occurs in the cases, we first treat s0, s1, and s2 as
fixed, and get the result in Theorem 3.4. By taking (r0, r1, r2, s0, s1, s2) =
(r0, 1, r2, 0, S, 0), r0 ≥ r2 > 0, and changing the table in the direction of u =
(1,−1, 0, 0, 0, 0), we attain the upper bound N
2
RS
(
1− 1
S+1
)
. The same analysis
for a change that occurs in the controls shows that the maximum change of
the Pearson χ2-statistic (i.e., Y in Appendix A) is N
2
RS
(
1− 1
R+1
)
.
If we have no knowledge of either the cases or the controls, we get the
sensitivity result presented in Corollary 3.5. On the other hand, when the
controls are known, we can use Theorem 3.4 to reduce the sensitivity assigned
to each set of SNPs grouped by the maximum number of controls among the
three genotypes. However, in most GWAS the number of controls, S, is
large and smax = max{s0, s1, s2} ≥ S/3. In this case, the following compu-
tation shows that the reduction in sensitivity obtained by Theorem 3.4 is
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insignificant:{
N2
RS
S
1 + S
}/{
N2
RS
smax
1 + smax
}
≤
{
N2
RS
S
1 + S
}/{
N2
RS
S/3
1 + S/3
}
=
S + 3
S + 1
≈ 1.
In order to improve on statistical utility, Uhler et al. [2] proposed pro-
jecting the p-values that are larger than a threshold value onto the threshold
value itself to reduce the sensitivity. In Theorem 3.6 we generalize this result
to nonnegative score functions, showing how to incorporate projections into
the Laplace mechanism.
Theorem 3.6. Given a nonnegative function f(d), define hC(d) = max{C, f(d)},
with C > 0; i.e., we project values of f(d) that are smaller than C onto C.
Let s denote the sensitivity of hC(d), and suppose Y ∼ Laplace(0,
s
ǫ
), then
W (d) = max{C,Z(d)}, with Z(d) = hC(d) + Y , is ǫ-differentially private.
Proof. From the definition of W (d), we know that W (d) ≥ C for all d. For
t > C,
P(W (d) = t)
P(W (d′) = t)
=
P(Z(d) = t)
P(Z(d′) = t)
≤ exp
(∣∣∣∣ |t− hC(d′)| − |t− hC(d)|
∣∣∣∣ǫ/s
)
≤ exp (|hC(d)− hC(d
′)| ǫ/s)
≤ exp (ǫ) .
For t = C,
P(W (d) = C)
P(W (d′) = C)
=
P(Z(d) ≤ C)
P(Z(d′) ≤ C)
=
1
2
exp
(
C−hC(d)
s/ǫ
)
1
2
exp
(
C−hC(d′)
s/ǫ
)
≤ exp (|hC(d
′)− hC(d)| ǫ/s)
≤ exp (ǫ) .
For example, when we apply this result to χ2-statistics in a differentially-
private mechanism, we set C to be the χ2-statistic that corresponds to a
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small p-value and use an upper bound for the sensitivity of the projection
function as sC , namely
sC = min
{
Ymax − C,
N2
RS
(
1−
1
max{S,R}+ 1
)}
.
3.2. Sensitivity Results for the Allelic Test Statistic
Theorem 3.7. The sensitivity of the allelic test statistic based on a 2 × 3
contingency table with positive margins, R cases and S controls is given by
the maximum of 

8N2S
R(2S + 3)(2S + 1)
,
4N2[(2R2 − 1)(2S − 1)− 1]
RS(2R + 1)(2R− 1)(2S + 1)
,
8N2R
S(2R+ 3)(2R + 1)
,
4N2[(2S2 − 1)(2R− 1)− 1]
RS(2S + 1)(2S − 1)(2R + 1)


.
Proof. See Appendix B.
4. Privacy-Preserving Release of the Top M Statistics
In a GWAS setting, researchers usually assign to every SNP a score that
reflects its association with a disease, but only release scores for the M most
significant SNPs. Most commonly used scores are the Pearson χ2-statistic,
the allelic test statistic, and the corresponding p-values. If those M SNPs
were chosen according to a uniform distribution, ǫ-differential privacy can
be achieved by the Laplace mechanism with noise Ms
ǫ
, where s denotes the
sensitivity of the scoring statistic. Recall that ǫ is the privacy budget, so a
smaller value of ǫ implies stronger privacy guarantees.
However, by releasing M SNPs according to their rankings, an attacker
knows that the released SNPs have higher scores than all other SNPs re-
gardless of the face value of the released scores. Therefore, we need a more
sophisticated algorithm for releasing the M most significant SNPs.
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Algorithm 1 The ǫ-differentially private algorithm for releasing theM most
relevant SNPs using the Laplace mechanism.
Input: The score (e.g., χ2-statistic or allelic test statistic) used to rank all
M ′ SNPs, the number of SNPs, M , that we want to release, the sensitivity,
s, of the statistic, and ǫ, the privacy budget.
Output: M noisy statistics.
1. Add Laplace noise with mean zero and scale 4Ms
ǫ
to the true statistics.
2. Pick the top M SNPs with respect to the perturbed statistics. Denote
the corresponding set of SNPs by S.
3. Add new Laplace noise with mean zero and scale 2Ms
ǫ
to the true statis-
tics in S.
Adapting from the differentially-private algorithm for releasing the most
frequent patterns in Bhaskar et al. [22], Uhler et al. [2] suggested an algorithm
(see Algorithm 1) for releasing theM most relevant SNPs ranked by their χ2-
statistics or the corresponding p-values while satisfying differential privacy.
They also showed that adding noise directly to the χ2-statistic achieves a
better trade-off between privacy and utility than by adding noise to the p-
values or cell entries themselves. Using the results from Section 3, we can
now also apply this algorithm when the number of cases and controls differ.
While Algorithm 1 is based on the Laplace mechanism, in Algorithm 2 we
propose a new algorithm based on the exponential mechanism by adopting
and simplifying the ideas proposed by Johnson and Shmatikov [3]. The first
application of the exponential mechanism in the GWAS setting was given in
[2], which resulted in a differentially private algorithm for detecting epistasis.
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm 2 is ǫ-differentially private.
Proof. See Appendix C.
5. Application of Differentially Private Release Mechanisms to Hu-
man GWAS Data
In this section we evaluate the trade-off between data utility and privacy
risk by applying Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 with the new sensitivity re-
sults developed in Section 3 to a GWAS data set containing human DNA
samples from WTCCC. We also compare the performance of Algorithm 1
10
Algorithm 2 The ǫ-differentially private algorithm for releasing theM most
relevant SNPs using the exponential mechanism.
Input: The score (e.g., χ2-statistic or allelic test statistic) used to rank all
M ′ SNPs, the number of SNPs, M , that we want to release, the sensitivity,
s, of the statistic, and ǫ, the privacy budget.
Output: M noisy statistics.
1. Let S = ∅ and qi = score of SNPi.
2. For i ∈ {1, . . . ,M ′}, set wi = exp
( ǫqi
4Ms
)
.
3. Set pi = wi
/
M ′∑
j=1
wj , i ∈ {1, . . . ,M
′}, the probability of sampling the
ith SNP.
4. Sample k ∈ {1, . . . ,M ′} with probability {p1, . . . , pM ′}. Add SNPk to
S. Set qk = −∞.
5. If the size of S is less than M , return to Step 2.
6. Add new Laplace noise with mean zero and scale 2Ms
ǫ
to the true statis-
tics in S.
and Algorithm 2 to that of the LocSig method developed by Johnson and
Shmatikov [3]. Essential to the LocSig method is a scoring function based
on the p-value of a statistical test. In this paper, we call the resulting scores
the JS scores. In contrast to [3], which used the p-value of the G-test to
construct the JS scores, we use the p-value of the Pearson χ2-test instead.
5.1. Data Set from WTCCC: Crohn’s Disease
We use a real data set that was collected by the WTCCC and intended
for genome-wide association studies of Crohn’s disease. The data set consists
of DNA samples from 3 cohorts, the subjects of which all lived within Great
Britain and identified themselves as white Europeans: 1958 British Birth
Cohort (58C), UK Blood Services (NBS), and Crohn’s disease (CD). In the
original study [23] the DNA samples from the 58C and NBS cohorts are
treated as controls and those from the CD cohort as cases.
The data were sampled using the Affymetrix GeneChip 500K Mapping
Array Set. The genotype data were called by an algorithm named CHI-
AMO (see [23]), which WTCCC developed and deemed more powerful than
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Affymetrix’s BRLMM genotype calling algorithm. According to the WTCCC
analysis, some DNA samples were contaminated or came from non-Caucasian
ancestry. In addition, they indicated that some SNPs did not pass quality
control filters. Finally, WTCCC [23] removed additional SNPs from their
analysis by visually inspecting cluster plots.
5.2. Our Re-Analysis of the WTCCC Data
In [23], the authors mainly used the allelic test and the Pearson χ2-test
to find SNPs with a strong association with Crohn’s disease, and reported
the relevant statistics and their p-values for the most significant SNPs. In
general, the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium [23] considered a SNP
significant if its allelic test p-value or χ2-test p-value were smaller than 10−5.
In the supplementary material of [23] they reported 26 significant SNPs, 6
of which were imputed. Per [23], imputing SNPs that do not exist in the
WTCCC databases does not affect the calculation of the allelic test statis-
tics or the Pearson χ2-statistics of SNPs already in the WTCCC databases;
therefore, we disregard the imputed SNPs in our analysis and retain 20 sig-
nificant SNPs.
We followed the filtering process in [23] closely and removed DNA samples
and SNPs that [23] deemed contaminated. However, we did not remove any
further SNPs due to poor cluster plots. We verified that our processing of
the raw genotype data leads to the same results as those published in the
supplementary material of [23]: our calculations for 16 of the 20 reported
significant SNPs match those in [23], deviating no more than 2% in allelic
test statistic and χ2-statistic. However, we found that a number of significant
SNPs were not reported by the WTCCC. We corresponded with one of the
principal authors of [23] and received confirmation that the WTCCC also
found those SNPs to be significant. However, Wellcome Trust Case Control
Consortium [23] did not report these SNPs because they suffered from poor
calling quality according to visual inspection of the cluster plot, a procedure
that we did not implement. We excluded from our analysis these SNPs that
have significant allelic test p-values or χ2-test p-values, but are not reported
by the WTCCC.
In Figure 1 we plot the χ2-statistics resulting from our analysis in de-
scending order. Note that there is a large gap between the 5th and the 6th
largest χ2-statistics. This is an important observation for the risk-utility
analysis of the perturbed statistics in Section 5.3. Because of the nature of
the distribution of the top χ2-statistics in this data set, it is easier to recover
12
Figure 1: Unperturbed top χ-statistics in descending order.
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all top 5 SNPs as the top rated 5 SNPs in the perturbed data than it is to
recover all topM SNPs forM < 5 orM > 5, as is evident in Figure 2, which
we discuss in the next section.
To summarize, we were able to reproduce a high percentage of significant
SNPs from [23]. Therefore, we are confident that our data processing proce-
dure is sound and the χ2-statistics and allelic test statistics that we obtained
from the data are comparable with those produced in a high quality GWAS.
5.3. Risk-Utility Analysis of Differentially Private Pearson χ2-statistics
In this section, we use the χ2-statistics obtained from theWTCCC dataset
described in Section 5.1 and analyze the statistical utility of releasing differ-
entially private χ2-statistics for various privacy budgets, ǫ. With 1748 cases
and 2938 controls in the WTCCC dataset, we use Corollary 3.5 to obtain a
sensitivity of 4.27 for the χ2-statistic.
We define statistical utility as follows: let S0 be the set of top M SNPs
ordered according to their true χ2-statistics and let S be the set of top M
SNPs chosen after perturbation (either by Algorithm 1 using the Laplace
mechanism or by Algorithm 2 using the exponential mechanism). Then the
utility as a function of ǫ is
u(ǫ) =
|S0 ∩ S|
|S0|
.
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We perform the following procedure to approximate the expected utility
E[u(ǫ)] for Algorithm 1: (i) add Laplace noise with mean zero and scale 4Ms
ǫ
to
the true χ2-statistics, where s is the sensitivity of the χ2-statistic; (ii) pick the
top M SNPs with respect to the perturbed χ2-statistics; (iii) denote the set
of SNPs chosen according to the true and perturbed χ2-statistics by S0 and
S, respectively; (iv) calculate u(ǫ) = |S0∩S|
|S0|
. We repeat the aforementioned
procedure 50 times for a fixed ǫ and report the average of the utility u(ǫ).
To approximate E[u(ǫ)] for Algorithm 2, we repeat 50 times the process of
generating S by performing steps 1–5 in Algorithm 2 and report the average
of the utility u(ǫ). In order to approximate E[u(ǫ)] for the procedure LocSig
from [3], we rank the SNPs by their χ2-statistics but replace the scores in
Step 1 by the JS scores.
The runtimes of the different algorithms vary considerably (see Table
3). The runtimes were obtained on a PC with an Intel i5-3570K CPU, 32
GB of RAM and the Ubuntu 13.04 operating system. Calculating the χ2-
statistics from genotype tables is a trivial task and takes very little time.
Calculating the JS scores can be a daunting task, however, if one cannot
find a clever simplification. The JS score is essentially the shortest Hamming
distance between the original database and the set of databases at which
the significance of the p-value changes. Thus without any simplifications,
one would need to search the entire space of databases in order to find the
table with the shortest Hamming distance. In our implementation for finding
the JS score for a genotype table based on the p-value corresponding to
the χ2-statistic, we simplify the calculation by greedily following the path
of maximum change of the χ2-statistic until we find a table with altered
Table 3: Comparison of runtime for the simulations in Section.5.3 The number of repeti-
tions is 50, the number of different values for M is 4, the number of different values for ǫ
is 15, and the number of SNPs is around 4000. S is the set of SNPs to be released after
the perturbation.
Method
Time spent on
generating S
(in minutes)
Time spent on
calculating the scores
(in minutes)
Algorithm 1 (Laplace) 0.04 ≈ 0
Algorithm 2 (Exponential) 1.53 ≈ 0
LocSig (JS) 2.00 3.50
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significance.
In Figure 2, we compare the performance of Algorithm 1 (based on the
Laplace mechanism) and Algorithm 2 (based on the exponential mechanism)
to LocSig ([3]). It is clear that when ǫ = 1, the LocSig method outperforms
the other methods with respect to utility. Nevertheless, we note a few features
regarding the performance of LocSig .
• When M = 3, the utility of the LocSig method cannot exceed 0.67
even as ǫ continues to increase. This artifact is due to the fact that the
ranking of SNPs based on the JS scores is different from the ranking
based on the χ2-statistics.
• Table 4 gives the top 6 SNPs ranked by their χ2-statistics and the
corresponding JS scores. For all threshold p-values, the JS score of the
4th SNP is larger than that of the 2nd SNP and that of the ith SNP
for i ≥ 5. Thus, when ǫ is sufficiently large, the LocSig method will
almost always output the 1st, 3rd, and 4th SNPs. Consequently, the
utility for the LocSig method will not increase when ǫ increases.
• The LocSig method is sensitive to the choice of p-value. This becomes
apparent in the plots for M = 15 in Figure 2. The risk-utility curves
of the LocSig method tend to have lower utility for the same ǫ when
the threshold p-value is smaller.
• Even though Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 do not perform as well as
the LocSig method for small values of ǫ, they do not suffer from the
aforementioned issues. Furthermore, we can see from Figure 2 that the
Table 4: Ranking of the top 6 SNPs by χ2-statistics and the corresponding JS scores. K
denotes the total number of SNPs.
Scoring scheme Threshold p-value Score (nearest integer)
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
χ2-statistic - 61 54 54 52 48 34
JS score 0.001/K 51 31 37 33 25 6
JS score 0.01/K 61 38 47 41 33 13
JS score 0.05/K 69 43 55 48 38 18
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exponential mechanism always outperforms the Laplace mechanism,
i.e., it achieves a higher utility for each value of ǫ.
To summarize, in this application Algorithm 2 outperforms Algorithm 1.
The method based on LocSig improves on Algorithm 2 for small values
of ǫ, but shows some problematic behavior when ǫ increases. Finally, the
LocSig method comes at a much higher computational cost than the other
two algorithms and might not be computationally feasible for some data sets.
6. Conclusions
A number of authors have argued that it is possible to use aggregate
data to compromise the privacy of individual-level information collected in
GWAS databases. We have used the concept of differential privacy and
built on the approach in Uhler et al. [2] to propose new methods to release
aggregate GWAS data without compromising an individual’s privacy. A
key component of the differential privacy approach involves the sensitivity
of a released statistic when we remove an observation. In this paper, we
have obtained sensitivity results for the Pearson χ2-statistic when there are
arbitrary number of cases and controls. Furthermore, we showed that the
sensitivity can be reduced in the situation where data for the cases (or the
controls) are known to the attacker. Nevertheless, we also showed that the
reduction in sensitivity is insignificant in typical GWAS, in which the number
of cases is large.
By incorporating the two-step differentially-private mechanism for releas-
ing the top M SNPs (Algorithm 1) with the projected Laplace perturbation
mechanism (Theorem 3.6), we have created an algorithm that outputs signif-
icant SNPs while preserving differential privacy. We demonstrated that the
algorithm works effectively in human GWAS datasets, and that it produces
outputs that resemble the outputs of regular GWAS. We also showed that
the performance of Algorithm 1, which is based on the Laplace mechanism,
can be improved by using Algorithm 2, which is based on the exponential
mechanism. Furthermore, Algorithm 2 is computationally more efficient than
the LocSig method of Johnson and Shmatikov [3], and it performs better for
increasing values of ǫ.
Finally, we showed that a risk-utility analysis of the algorithm allows us to
understand the trade-off between privacy budget and statistical utility, and
therefore helps us decide on the appropriate level of privacy guarantee for the
16
Figure 2: Performance comparison of Algorithm 1 (“Laplace”), Algorithm 2 with χ2-
statistics as scores (“Exponential”), and the LocSig method in Johnson and Shmatikov
[3] (“JS”) based on the p-value of the χ2-statistic. Each row corresponds to a fixed M ,
the number of top SNPs to release. Each column corresponds to a fixed threshold p-
value, which is relevant to the LocSig method only; it is irrelevant to the other methods.
Data used to generate this figure consist of SNPs with p-values smaller than 10−5 and a
randomly chosen 1% sample of SNPs with p-values larger than 10−5; the total number of
SNPs used for calculation is 3882.
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released data. We hope that approaches such as those that we demonstrate
in this paper will allow the release of more information from GWAS going
17
forward and allay the privacy concerns that others have voiced over the past
decade.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 3.4
Proof. The Pearson χ2-statistic can be written as
Y =
(
r0 −
n0R
N
)2
n0R
N
+
(
r1 −
n1R
N
)2
n1R
N
+
(
r2 −
n2R
N
)2
n2R
N
+
(
s0 −
n0S
N
)2
n0S
N
+
(
s1 −
n1S
N
)2
n1S
N
+
(
s2 −
n2S
N
)2
n2S
N
= (r0N − n0R)
2
(
1
n0RN
+
1
n0SN
)
+ (r1N − n1R)
2
(
1
n1RN
+
1
n1SN
)
+ (r2N − n2R)
2
(
1
n2RN
+
1
n2SN
)
=
(r0N − n0R)
2
n0RS
+
(r1N − n1R)
2
n1RS
+
(r2N − n2R)
2
n2RS
=
r20N
2
n0RS
−
2r0N
S
+
n0R
S
+
r21N
2
n1RS
−
2r1N
S
+
n1R
S
+
r22N
2
n2RS
−
2r2N
S
+
n2R
S
=
N2
RS
(
r20
n0
+
r21
n1
+
r22
n2
)
−N
R
S
(A.1a)
=
N2
RS
(
s20
n0
+
s21
n1
+
s22
n2
)
−N
S
R
. (A.1b)
We denote a contingency table and its column sums by v = (r0, r1, r2, s0, s1, s2,
n0, n1, n2). Let v
′ = v + u, with v′ and v differing by Hamming distance 1.
Finding the sensitivity of Y boils down to finding v and u that maximize
|Y (v)− Y (v + u)|.
Suppose r0 > 0 and consider u = (−1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0,−1, 1, 0). As a conse-
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quence of (A.1b) we find that
Y (v)− Y (v + u) =
[
N2
RS
(
s20
n0
+
s21
n1
+
s22
n2
)
−N
S
R
]
−
[
N2
RS
(
s20
n0 − 1
+
s21
n1 + 1
+
s22
n2
)
−N
S
R
]
=
N2
RS
[
s21
n1(n1 + 1)
−
s20
n0(n0 − 1)
]
.
Because r0 > 0, we get that n0 = r0 + s0 ≥ 1 + s0, and
0 ≤
s20
n0(n0 − 1)
≤
s0
n0
≤
s0
1 + s0
≤
smax
1 + smax
.
Similarly,
0 ≤
s21
n1(n1 + 1)
≤
s1
n1 + 1
≤
s1
1 + s1
≤
smax
1 + smax
.
Therefore,∣∣∣∣ s21n1(n1 + 1) −
s20
n0(n0 − 1)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ max
{
s21
n1(n1 + 1)
,
s20
n0(n0 − 1)
}
≤
smax
1 + smax
.
A similar analysis for all possible directions u and scenarios in which r1 > 0
or r2 > 0 reveals that the sensitivity of Y is bounded above by
N2
RS
smax
1+smax
.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 3.7
Proof. We denote a contingency table and its column sums by v = (r0, r1, r2,
s0, s1, s2, n0, n1, n2). With the number of cases, R, and the number of con-
trols, S, fixed, we can simply write vs = (s1, s2, n1, n2) or v
r = (r1, r2, n1, n2).
Then the allelic test statistic can be written as
YA(v
s) =
2N3
RS
{(s1 + 2s2)−
S
N
(n1 + 2n2)}
2
2N(n1 + 2n2)− (n1 + 2n2)2
,
or YA(v
r) =
2N3
RS
{(r1 + 2r2)−
R
N
(n1 + 2n2)}
2
2N(n1 + 2n2)− (n1 + 2n2)2
.
Let v′ = v+u, with v′ and v differing by Hamming distance 1. Finding the
sensitivity of YA boils down to finding v and v
′ that maximize |YA(v)−YA(v
′)|.
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This is equivalent to maximizing |YA(v
s)−YA(v
s+us)| and |YA(v
r)−YA(v
r+
ur)|, with us and ur defined as follows:
when r0 > 0,
us1 = (0, 0, 1, 0) (Case 0→ Case 1)
us2 = (0, 0, 0, 1) (Case 0→ Case 2)
when s0 > 0,
ur1 = (0, 0, 1, 0) (Control 0→ Control 1)
ur2 = (0, 0, 0, 1) (Control 0→ Control 2).
In other words, when r0 > 0, we search for tables that maximize |∇YA(v
s) ·
us1|r0>0 or |∇YA(v
s) ·us2|r0>0; when s0 > 0, we search for tables that maximize
|∇YA(v
r) · ur1|s0>0 and |∇YA(v
r) · ur2|s0>0.
Let’s first consider the case r0 > 0. We have |∇YA(v
s) · us1| =
∣∣∣ ∂∂n1YA(vs)
∣∣∣
and |∇YA(v
s) · us2| =
∣∣∣ ∂∂n2YA(vs)
∣∣∣. Denote by
α =
2N3
S(N − S)
,
C = (s1 + 2s2)−
S
N
(n1 + 2n2),
D = 2N(n1 + 2n2)− (n1 + 2n2)
2 = (n1 + 2n2)(2n0 + n1),
then
YA = α
C2
D
,
∂
∂n1
YA(v
s) = α
−2
[
(N − n1 − 2n2)C
2 + S
N
DC
]
D2
= α
−2
D2
[
(n0 − n2)C
2 +
S
N
DC
]
,
∂
∂n2
YA(v
s) = 2
∂
∂n1
YA(v
s).
Therefore, tables that maximize |∇YA(v
s) · us1|r0>0 also maximize |∇YA(v
s) ·
us2|r0>0. Furthermore, for the same table v
s, the change of YA(v
s) in the
direction of us2 is no less than that in the direction of u
s
1.
Fixing n1 and n2,
∣∣∣ ∂∂n1YA(vs)
∣∣∣ depends only on s1 and s2. So maximizing
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∣∣∣ ∂∂n1YA(vs)
∣∣∣ is equivalent to maximizing the absolute value of
f(s1, s2) := (n0 − n2)C
2 +
S
N
DC
=
S
N
DC In0=n2 + (n0 − n2)
{[
C +
SD
2N(n0 − n2)
]2
−
[
SD
2N(n0 − n2)
]2}
In0 6=n2
=
S
N
DC In0=n2 + (n0 − n2)
{
[g(s1, s2)]
2 −
[
SD
2N(n0 − n2)
]2}
In0 6=n2,
where g(s1, s2) = C +
SD
2N(n0−n2)
= (s1+2s2)+
S(n1+2n2)2
2N(n0−n2)
. Note that the term
D does not depend on s1 or s2. There are three scenarios:
(i) when n0 = n2, |f(s1, s2)| =
S
N
D|(s1+2s2)−
S
N
(n1+2n2)| is maximized
when s1 + 2s2 is minimized or maximized;
(ii) when n0 > n2, |f(s1, s2)| is maximized when |g(s1, s2)| is maximized or
minimized, which occurs when s1 + 2s2 is minimized or maximized;
(iii) when n0 < n2, |f(s1, s2)| is maximized when |g(s1, s2)| is maximized or
minimized as well. Because
g(s1, s2) = (s1 + 2s2)−
S(n1 + 2n2)
2
2N(n2 − n0)
= (s1 + 2s2)−
S(N + n2 − n0)
2
2N(n2 − n0)
= (s1 + 2s2)− S
[
1 +
N2 + (n2 − n0)
2
2N(n2 − n0)
]
≤ (s1 + 2s2)− 2S, because N
2 + (n2 − n0)
2 ≥ 2N(n2 − n0)
≤ 0,
|g(s1, s2)| is maximized when (s1+2s2) is minimized, and it is minimized
when (s1 + 2s2) is maximized.
The preceding analysis shows that for any given n1 and n2,
∣∣∣ ∂∂n1YA(vs)
∣∣∣ is
maximized when (s1 + 2s2) is maximized or minimized; in other words, to
maximize
∣∣∣ ∂∂n1YA(vs)
∣∣∣, we only need to consider tables for which (s1, s2) =
(0, 0) or (s1, s2) = (n1, n2).
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Given (s1, s2) = (0, 0), we have C = −
S
N
(n1 + 2n2), and
∂
∂n1
YA(v
s)
/
(−2α) = (n0 − n2)
C2
D2
+
SC
ND
= (n0 − n2)
[
S
N
(n1 + 2n2)
]2
[(n1 + 2n2)(2n0 + n1)]
2 +
S
N
− S
N
(n1 + 2n2)
(n1 + 2n2)(2n0 + n1)
= −
S2
N(2n0 + n1)2
.
So
∣∣∣ ∂∂n1YA(vs)
∣∣∣ is maximized when 2n0 + n1 is minimized. Because (r0 >
0, s1 = s2 = 0) =⇒ (r0 ≥ 1, r1 = n1, r2 = n2, s0 = S) =⇒ (n0 ≥ S + 1, n1 ≥
1), the minimum occurs at vs = (0, 0, 1, R− 2), i.e.,

r0 = 1, r1 = 1, r2 = R− 2,
s0 = S, s1 = 0, s2 = 0,
n0 = S + 1, n1 = 1, n2 = R− 2.
Given (s1, s2) = (n1, n2), we have C =
R
N
(n1 + 2n2), and
∂
∂n1
YA(v
s)
/
(−2α) = (n0 − n2)
[
R
N
(n1 + 2n2)
]2
[(n1 + 2n2)(2n0 + n1)]
2 +
S
N
R
N
(n1 + 2n2)
(n1 + 2n2)(2n0 + n1)
=
R(S + n0 − n2)
N(2n0 + n1)2
= −
1
N
[(
R
2n0 + n1
−
1
2
)2
−
1
4
]
.
Because (s1 = n1, s2 = n2) =⇒ (r1 = r2 = 0) =⇒ (r0 = R) =⇒ (n0 ≥ R),
we have 0 < R
2n0+n1
< 1/2 =⇒ 0 <
(
R
2n0+n1
− 1
2
)2
< 1/4. So
∣∣∣ ∂∂n1YA(vs)
∣∣∣ is
maximized when
(
R
2n0+n1
− 1
2
)2
is minimized, which is achieved when 2n0+n1
is minimized, which occurs at vs = (1, S − 1, 1, S − 1), i.e.,

r0 = R, r1 = 0, r2 = 0,
s0 = 0, s1 = 1, s2 = S − 1,
n0 = R, n1 = 1, n2 = S − 1.
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To summarize, when r0 > 0, for any table v
s, the change of YA(v
s) in
the direction of us2 is no less than that in the direction of u
s
1. The maximum
change of YA in the direction of u2 = (−1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0,−1, 0, 1) ≡ u
s
2 occurs
at v∗1 = (1, 1, R− 2, S, 0, 0, S + 1, 1, R− 2),
with ∆1 = |YA(v
∗
1)− YA(v
∗
1 + u2)|
=
2N3
RS
(
S
N
)2 ∣∣∣∣ 2R− 32N − (2R− 3) − 2R− 12N − (2R− 1)
∣∣∣∣
=
8N2S
R(2S + 3)(2S + 1)
,
or at v∗2 = (R, 0, 0, 0, 1, S − 1, R, 1, S − 1),
with ∆2 = |YA(v
∗
2)− YA(v
∗
2 + u2)|
=
2N3
RS
{(
R
N
)2
2S − 1
2R + 1
−
[
R
N
(2S + 1)− 2
]2
(2S + 1)(2R− 1)
}
=
8N2[R2(2S − 1)− S]
RS(2S + 1)(2R + 1)(2R− 1)
.
The same analysis for s0 > 0 reveals that |∇YA(v
r) · u4| = 2 |∇YA(v
r) · u3| =
2
∣∣∣ ∂∂n1YA(vr)
∣∣∣, and the maximum change of YA in the direction of u4 =
(0, 0, 0,−1, 0, 1,−1, 0, 1) ≡ ur2 occurs
at v∗3 = (R, 0, 0, 1, 1, S − 2, R+ 1, 1, S − 2),
with ∆3 = |YA(v
∗
3)− YA(v
∗
3 + u4)| =
8N2R
S(2R + 3)(2R + 1)
,
or at v∗4 = (0, 1, R− 1, S, 0, 0, S, 1, R− 1),
with ∆4 = |YA(v
∗
4)− YA(v
∗
4 + u4)| =
8N2[S2(2R− 1)− R]
RS(2R + 1)(2S + 1)(2S − 1)
.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. To show that Algorithm 2 is ǫ-differentially private, it suffices to show
that choosing S is ǫ/2-differentially private. The rest of the proof follows from
the proof of Algorithm 1 in Uhler et al. [2].
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Following the notation in McSherry and Talwar [24], we define the random
variable of sampling a single SNP, εǫq, by
Pr(εǫq(D) = i) ∝ exp
(
ǫq(D, i)
2∆q
)
µ(i)
∝ exp
(
ǫq(D, i)
2s
)
where q(D, i) is the score for SNPi, s is the sensitivity for the scoring function
q(D, i), and µ(i) = 1/M ′ is constant. We also define
qB(D, i) =
{
score of the SNPi if i /∈ B
−∞ if i ∈ B
.
where B is a set of SNPs and qB denotes the scoring function given that
the SNPs in B have been sampled and thus have 0 sampling probability in
subsequent sampling steps. Note that
Pr(εǫqB(D) = i, i /∈ B) =
exp
(
ǫqB(D,i)
2s
)
∑
j /∈B exp
(
ǫqB(D,j)
2s
)
≤
exp
(
ǫ[qB(D
′,r)+s]
2s
)
∑
j /∈B exp
(
ǫ[qB(D′,r)−s]
2s
)
= eǫ Pr(εǫqB(D
′) = i, i /∈ B).
Let σ denote a permutation of S.
Pr(sampling S|D) =
∑
σ∈σ(S)
Pr(εǫ/(2M)q (D) = σ(1))
M∏
i=2
Pr(εǫ/(2M)q{σ(j),j<i}(D) = σ(i))
≤
∑
σ∈σ(S)
{
eǫ/(2M) Pr(εǫ/(2M)q (D
′) = σ(1))
}
M∏
i=2
{
eǫ/(2M) Pr(εǫ/(2M)q{σ(j),j<i}(D
′) = σ(i))
}
= eǫ/2 Pr(sampling S|D′).
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